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ABSTRACT: Underground construction is widely adopted in urban area but sometimes the construction might 
cause severely failure. In this paper, successful interpretation of instrument data is addressed and several ex-
amples are demonstrated since geotechnical monitoring is thought to be an effective tool to avoid failure. Fur-
ther, the failure may also be caused by misinterpretation of responsibilities of parties relating underground 
construction so responsibilities distribution in site investigation, design, construction and geotechnical moni-
toring are discussed. It is recommended that adequate data of site investigation shall be provided by the client 
and shall not leave all responsibilities to the contractor. Well- experienced experts shall be invited to evaluate 
the quantity and quality of data of site investigation before the project goes to tender. 
1 INTRODUCTON  
Underground construction is widely adopted for 
the need of underground space due to fast devel-
opment of urban area in Taiwan but unfortunately 
disastrous failure sometimes might also be in-
duced. In this paper, successful interpretation of 
instrument data for underground construction is 
addressed and several examples are demonstrated 
based on underground metro in both Taipei and 
Kaohsiung, Taiwan since geotechnical monitoring 
is commonly thought to be an effective tool to 
avoid failure. Further, the failure may be caused by 
misinterpretation of responsibilities of parties relat-
ing underground construction so responsibilities- 
sharing between the client, consultants and con-
tractors in site investigation, design, construction 
and geotechnical monitoring are discussed. 
 
2 UNDERGROUND WORKS IN TAIPEI AND 
KAOHSIUNG 
As underground metros in two major cities in Tai-
wan, Kaohsiung and Taipei were adopted as the 
background for this paper and a general view of 
geology and network in both cities are described 
first.  
Taipei is located in northern Taiwan and it is 
the centre of the political and economic activities 
in the country. The city is mainly located in Taipei 
Basin which formed by river deposits from three 
major rivers, Tahan Creek, Hsintien Creek and 
Keelung River. Three geological zones surround 
the Taipei Basin. The Tantu volcano group is to the 
north, Linkuo Tableland is to the west and the Ter-
tiary sedimentary rocks to the southeast.  The to-
tal area of the 243 square km Taipei basin has an 
altitude less than 20 m above the mean sea level.  
The average elevation of the Taipei Basin is about 
5 m above mean sea level. As mentioned above, 
the basin was filled with river deposits. The base of 
the Taipei basin mainly consists of sedimentary 
rock with minor amounts of volcanic rocks of the 
Tatun volcanic group in the north region of the ba-
sin. In cores obtained from a 260m deep explorato-
ry hole near the city centre of Taipei, Tertiary rock 
was found at 213m below ground level (Wang Lee 
and Lin, 1987). Hence, the depth of rock bed in the 
centre of the Taipei Basin is estimated to be around 
250 m.   
The sedimentary material above the rock may 
be divided into Hsinchuang, Chingmei and 
Sungshan Formations. Among them, the Hsin-
chuang Formation is only found in the western part 
of the Taipei Basin and includes the alluvial depos-




its from Tahan Creek. The Chingmei Formation is 
the alluvial deposit from Hsintein Creek, and con-
sists of 50 to 140 m thickness of gravel. The 
Sungshan Formation overlies the Chingmei For-
mation and it was formed of sands and clay depos-
ited by Tahan Creek, Hsintein Creek and Keelung 
River.   
Due to a need of the city, the mass rapid transit 
system in Taipei (TRTS) was initiated at the end of 
80’s and the network is still expanding. Most of 
construction works for TRTS were delivered un-
derground. For underground stations and crosso-
ver, the cut- and- cover method using reinforce-
ment concrete diaphragm wall as retaining 
structures with internal props was adopted and 
shield- machines were selected for bored tunnels. 
Kaohsiung is located in southern Taiwan and it 
is the 2nd largest city on the island. Figure 1 repre-
sents the geology of Kaohsiung City. The city is 
situated at the mouth of three rivers, Dien-Pao 
River in the north, Love River in the middle and 
Chien-Jen River in the south, and as a result the 
ground conditions in Kaohsiung city are mainly 
sandy and silty with clay, as depicted in Figure 1.  
The network of Kaohsiung mass rapid transit 
system (KRTS) was planned at late 90’s and fully 
commenced to construct in 2002. KRTS now has 
two lines and most of them were constructed un-
derground. Similar to TRTS, the cut- and- cover 
method was adopted for stations and crossover and 





























Fig. 1 Geology of Kaohsiung. 
3 INTERPRETATION OF INSTRUMENT 
DATA 
Instruments aim to provide useful information to 
prevent geotechnical failure in advance. Figure 2 
presents a typical cross section of geotechnical in-
struments used for underground works in Taiwan. 
As presented in Figure 2, instruments generally 
used on site include inclinometers in wall (SID) 
and soil (SIS), electrical piezometer (ELP) and 
standpipe piezometers (PS), observation wells 
(OW), strain gauge on reinforcement in the wall 
(RS), load cells on props and bench mark for sur-
face settlement (SM).  In order to indicate the per-
formance of adjacent buildings during the con-
struction, tiltmeters and bench mark points on the 
buildings were installed on the façade of the build-
ing to measure the tilting and settlement of the 
building.   
Examples taken from recent underground works 
in TRTS and KRTS are demonstrated in this paper 
to express how instrument data are interpreted. In 
addition, some special measurements taken on site 
















Fig. 2 Typical cross section of geotechnical instruments 
used for underground works in Taiwan. 
 
Wall deflections were measured at an excava-
tion located in eastern Taipei. The maximum exca-
vation depth of the site is 22.85 m and it was re-
tained by a 43 m deep, 1.2 m thick diaphragm wall. 
Eight- level internal bracing were adopted to pro-
vide additional horizontal supports.  It is also not-
ed that depth of bedrock on site was various, from 
28 m to 40 m below surface level.  It was found 
that a large wall displacement (up to 115 to 135 
mm) was measured and Figure 3 presents a com-
paratively poor quality of wall constructed on the 
site. It was constructed using hydraulic- grab type 
machine and it was reported by the contractor that 
appearance of rock affects the quality of the wall. 
Observations here did reflect the quality of wall 
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and this might not be pointed out during the design 
stage. 
Settlements of some buildings near an excava-
tion of TRTS also located in eastern Taipei were 
observed. It was found that all activities related to 
excavations were completed but these buildings 
continued to settle and the reason is unknown.  
Change of piezometric levels were further explored 
and it was found that piezometric levels in clay 
still gradually raise up but not reached the level be-
fore commence of the excavation. It was thus rec-
ommended that additional effective ground stress 
due to change of piezometric level should be the 
reason for additional buildings settlement and these 
buildings may not remain stable unless piezometric 
















Fig. 3 Quality of diaphragm wall 
 
Figure 4 presents the settlement of the buildings 
next to excavation of O6 Station in KRTS.  Simi-
lar to the example taken from Taipei, activities of 
excavation were completed but the building con-
tinued to settle.  As indicated in Figure 5, it was 
observed that pore pressure of ground continued to 
decrease, though the excavation was completed 
long time ago and this was thus thought to be the 































Fig. 5 Change of pore pressure 
 
A large- scale collapse due to construction of 
cross passage between two running tunnels in 
Kaohsiung Metro occurred in 2004. An under-
ground pass exactly above metro tunnel was also 
damaged and has to be rebuilt. It was confirmed 
that an unforeseen ground characteristic of silty 
sand in Kaohsiung in relation to soften of soil 
strength due to disturbance from the excavation is 
the main reason for the accident.   
Some emergency rescue mitigation measures 
were taken immediately after the accident but re-
construction of the whole project was started ap-
proximately 6 months after the accident.   
As shown in Figure 6, the central section of the 
tunnel was constructed using cut- and- cover 
method and 1.5 m thick, 60 m deep reinforcement 
diaphragm wall were installed first as retaining 
structure. The excavation was then conducted by 
11 stages. The maximum excavation depth is 30.2 
m. After excavation reached final excavation level, 
precast reinforcement concrete segments were 
erected on site to build the tunnel as well as cross 
passage between two running tunnels.  Backfill 
was delivered using the controlled low strength 
material (CLSM) from final excavation level to 
bottom of base slab of underground pass to fill 
space outside tunnels and reconstruction of under-
ground pass was carried out segment by segment. 
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Also depicted in Figure 6, 36 tunnel segments 
were also affected by accident and have to be re-
placed but all of them were located outside the cut- 
and- cover zone, ground freezing method was 
adopted to freeze the ground in order to stop flow 
of groundwater and then these segments were re-
placed. 
Thermometers were installed on site in order to 
confirm the ground freezing was fully completed.  
Most of thermometers were installed up to 12.0 to 
20.8 m below surface level but some of them were 
installed even deeper, to top of tunnel or into inside 
the tunnel though a punching hole on tunnel seg-
ment.  There were 40 thermometers in total and 
interval between two thermometers varies between 
1.8 m to 4.0 m.  Such measurement did provide 
useful indication during stages of ground freezing 
and replacing tunnel segment. 
At last, the other example also in Kaohsiung 
Metro was raise here to demonstrate the effective-
ness of instrument. A 37-year-old building stood 1 
to 4 m from a 20.1- m deep excavation and the ex-
cavation was retained by 0.8 m thick and 42.0 m 
deep diaphragm walls. The horizontal props using 
H- type steel were adopted to stiffen the excava-
tion. Except monitoring of ground performances 
caused by the deep excavation, structure perfor-
mance were measured and taken as base of damage 
assessment. Boscardin and Cording (1989) rec-
ommended that the damage to the structure is 
closely connected with horizontal strain and angu-
lar distortion and the device like horizontal tape 
extensometer, as shown in Figure 7 was used to 
measure the distance between two nails on façade 
of the building and expansion or shortening in 
comparison with previous measurement for the dis-
tance between two nails could thus be determined.  
Horizontal tensile or compressive strain could be 
interpreted also. 
Similarly, the angular distortion was calculated 
based on measurements of settlements of buildings 
from various points of the foundation.  Hsiung 
(2009) has approved that results from the damage 
assessment associated with the method suggested 
by Boscardin and Cording (1989) were satisfied 












Fig. 7 Measurement using tape extensometer 
4 DISCUSSIONS 
It is no doubt that success of geotechnical monitor-
ing could prevent failure but failure might also be 
made because of misinterpretation of responsibil-
ity- sharing associated with observations from un-
derground works in Taipei and Kaohsiung.  
Therefore, responsibility- sharing between the cli-
ent, designer and contractor in geotechnical inves-
tigation, design and monitoring is discussed asso-
ciated with lessons learned from recent 
construction of Taipei and Kaohsiung Metro. 
First of all, the responsibility of site investiga-
tion is discussed, especially in Design- Build and 
Turnkey (DBT) model construction project.  DBT 
model is a fast- track model for constructing un-
derground work and it has become more and more 
popular all over the world.  In DBT model, the 
employer (the client) is mainly responsible for land 
acquisition, access of the site, termination and ex-
tension of the contract and payment and leaves 
most of responsibilities of working performance to 
the contractor.  As the design is also delivered by 
the contractor itself, the employer is not involved 
with the design.  It is seen commonly that in 
many DBT model underground projects that the 
employer conducted very limited site investiga-
tions and testing so a clearly picture of ground 
characteristic could not been detected before com-
mence of construction.  However, in Clause 4.11 
of the Conditions of Contract for Design- Build 
and Turnkey prepared by the Federation Interma-
tionale des Ingenieurs- Conseils (FIDIC) “Unfore-
seeable Sub- Surface Conditions”, it states that “If 
sub- surface conditions are encountered by the 
Contractor which in his opinion were not foreseea-
ble by an experienced contractor, the Contractor 
shall give notice to the Employer’s Representative 
so that the Employer’s Representative can inspect 
such conditions….if such conditions were not fore-
seeable by an experienced contractor, proceed in 
accordance with Sub- Clause 3.5 to agree or de-
termine:  
(a) any extension of time to which the Con-
tract is entitled under Sub- Clause 8.3, and  
(b) the additional Cost due to such conditions, 
which shall be added to the Contract Price. 
In fact, ground characteristics might be sudden-
ly changed in a short period due to some external 
impacts and accident might occur before the con-
tractor could give any notice to the employer or 
employer’s representative. The after- event inves-
tigation could also indicate the accident was 
caused by an unforeseen ground condition and an 
well- known and experienced contractor are not 
suppose to be blamed in both cases, though the 
employer definitely push the responsibilities to the 
contractor. Moh and Hwang (2007) reviewed some 




major accidents of underground metro in Asia Pa-
cific and it was found that accidents in DBT model 
projects might lead 6 to 12 months delay of the 
project and repair cost could be up to USD 70 mil-
lion in one project.  Many of them were induced 
by unforeseen ground risk. Knights (2005) pre-
sented 15 projects over the period 1994 to 2004, 
which all faced major ground- related problems 
with financial losses, in total, of more than 500 
million US dollars. Clayton (2001) addressed that 
evidence from the past shows that construction 
cost overruns are significantly reduced as expendi-
ture on site investigation is increased. An example 
taken from Kaohsiung Metro was chosen for fur-
ther commentary. Figure 8 shows all boreholes of 
O6 Station of Kaohsiung Metro and it is seen there 
are 8 holes in the range of 200 m. Only 6 of them 
were conducted before and during tender stages (in 
the name of “BO”, “BH” and “OA”) and a full pic-
ture of ground conditions for excavations at O6 
Station could not be defined by information given 
here. Due to limit of time in preparation stage, a 
large- scale site investigation can not be conducted 
by the contractor so such data have to be well- pre-
pared by the employer. Inadequate data of site in-
vestigation may induce the accident and both of the 
employer and the contractor will suffer from the 
loss of accident so a “partnership” shall be formed 
between the employer and the contractor in order 
to prevent such matter, especially for an under-
ground project constructed in the place never has a 
similar project before. Considering reasons stated 
above, adequate data of site investigation shall be 
provided by the client and shall not leave all re-
sponsibilities to the contractor. Well- experienced 
experts shall be invited to evaluate the quantity and 
quality of data of site investigation before the pro-
















Fig. 8 Borehole information of O6 Station 
 
Second, the responsibility of design is dis-
cussed. It is thought reasonably that the responsi-
bility of design shall belong to the designer, no 
matter recruited by the employer directly or by the 
contractor. Due to fast development of computer 
hardware and software, computer- aided design is 
popularly adopted for geotechnical design of deep 
excavations and tunnel. Associated with exactly 
same soil parameters, Figure 9 presents outcome 
from 2- dimensional and 3- dimensional analytical 
results of lateral wall deflections with observation 
of a 19.7 m deep excavation.  Difference here 
might be contributed by different definition of in-
terface used in the software and boundaries and 
dimensions selected for analyses. Considering ob-
servations above, it is concluded that analytical re-
sults might be different due to various assumptions 
of the analytical mesh and model, though the same 
soil parameters were given.  In a large- scale un-
derground construction project, reasonable soil and 
structure parameters shall be provided by the em-
ployer before commence of design as this could 
possibly increase the reliability and minimize the 
risk in design, though different assumptions stated 






















Fig. 9 Analytical wall deflections 
 
Further, as shown in Figure 3, the quality of 
wall could not be predicted before commence of 
the design but could possibly be detected after wall 
installation.  The design of the excavation should 
thus be revised after wall installation because of 
the quality of wall. Moreover, conducting inde-
pendent check could increase the reliability of the 
design and it cost less for design change before 
commence of construction of an underground pro-
ject. It is thus recommended that independent 
checks shall be delivered and revision of design 
should be concerned from time to time in order to 
reduce the risk. The employer might not be capable 
to carry out tasks stated above and it is suggested 















that special consultants with expertise can be re-
cruited for it. 
It is anticipated that most of the responsibility 
of construction shall belong to the contractor.  
Recent problems for underground construction in 
Taiwan include: (1) it is hard to precisely evaluate 
cost and time of construction before commence of 
the project as the tender preparation period is very 
short; (2) low standard of pre-qualification adopted 
and lowest bid in a very competitive market lead to 
very limited budget of a project. These are key fac-
tors for defects, overrun and delay of construction 
of underground projects in Taiwan. 
At last, the responsibility of monitoring is dis-
cussed. In engineering practice in Taiwan, the em-
ployer does have a monitoring plan but the con-
tractor is the final decision maker for type, 
location, depth and quantity of instruments but has 
to submit the monitoring plan to the designer and 
the employer to ask for approval. During the con-
struction, a sub- contractor for monitoring is re-
sponsible for all site measurements and has to pass 
all data to the contractor for the first review and 
then to the designer and the employer for reviews 
also under certain circumstance.  Design change 
and protection measures of adjacent structures pro-
posed by the contractor are adopted if movements 
and stress of ground or structure are beyond the 
warning levels given by the employer.  Refer to 
examples from Taipei and Kaohsiung stated in this 
paper, the contractor was suppose to provide the 
reason and solutions but it seems the party was not 
capable to do so. It is thus suggested that geotech-
nical experts shall be invited to provide recom-
mendations based on monitoring data from time to 
time. 
As stated above, geotechnical failure might oc-
cur suddenly so automatic, real- time monitoring 
system can possibly pass message to all related 
parties shortly in order to extend time of response. 
Hsiung et al. (2011) described an intensive moni-
toring system using several automatic monitoring 
instruments for bored tunnels constructed beneath 
operating taxiway inside the international airport 




Some conclusions can be drawn based on findings 
from this paper.   
First, successful interpretation of instrument da-
ta is addressed and several examples are demon-
strated since geotechnical monitoring is thought to 
be an effective tool to avoid failure. Reliable in-
strument data can reflect the reality on site. 
Second, adequate data of site investigation shall 
be provided by the client and shall not leave all re-
sponsibility to the contractor due to any reason. 
Third, in a large- scale underground construc-
tion project, reasonable soil and structure parame-
ters shall be provided by the employer before 
commence of design as this could possibly in-
crease the reliability and minimize the risk. More-
over, conducting independent check could increase 
the reliability of the design. 
At last, it is suggested that geotechnical experts 
shall be invited to provide recommendations based 
on monitoring data from time to time. Geotech-
nical failure might occur suddenly so automatic, 
real- time monitoring system can possibly pass 
message to all related parties in order to extend 
time of response but the reliability of the instru-
ment has to be concerned.   
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